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LA WRENOE L. PICKENS et al., Appellants, v. FRED C.
JOHNSON et al., Respondents.
FRED C. JOHNSON et al., Respondents, v. LAWRENOE
L. PI OKENS et al., Appellants.
[1] Judges- Retirement- Constitutional Provision Enabling.Const., art. IV, § 22a, declaring that Legislature may provide
state retirement system, is an enabling provision authorizing
Legislature to provide system for retirement of members of
judicial department of state embraced within Judges' Retirement Law. (Stats. 1937, p. 2204.)
[2] !d.-Retirement-Assignment and Service of Retired Judge.The provision for assignment and service of a retired judge
in accordance with Judges' Retirement Law bears a reasonable
relationship to system of judges' retirement; it is inherently
connected with problems of administration of justice under
which the state, in consideration for retirement allowance,
may invoke assistance of retired personnel of judicial department in emergencies found to exist by chairman of Judicial
Council.
[3] !d.-Retirement-Status of Retired Judge.-The Constitution
does not prohibit the Legislature from providing, as it has in
Judges' Retirement Act, § 6, that so long as he receives a retirement allowance a retired judge shall be a judicial officer
of the state.
[4] Id.-Retirement-Prerequisites.-In order for a superior court
judge to retire he must, while in office, file his notice of retirement with Secretary of State as provided in Judges' Retirement Act, § 1. (Stats. 1937, p. 2204.)
[5] !d.-Retirement--Privileges and Duties.-While in retirement
a judge has privilege of maintaining his membership in State
Bar, and as such he is entitled to privileges and immunities
and is subject to duties and obligations of an attorney at law
so long as he maintains his membership in State Bar.
[6] !d.-Retirement-Effect of Assignment.-A retired judge's
assignment as judge of superior court for designated county
by chairman of Judicial Council does not prolong his term of
office, but merely has effect of vesting in him powers of judge
of superior court during period specified in assignment.
[7] !d.-Retirement--Term of Assignment.-Under proper exercise
of power of assignment a retired judge will not be continued
McK. Dig. References: [1-17] Judges, § 17.5; [18] Landlord and
'fenant, § 259.
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in service indefinitely, the term of assignment being necessarily
within wise discretion of chairman of Judicial Council.
[8] !d.-Retirement-Status After Expiration of Assignment.Upon expiration of period of his assignment a retired judge
resumes his prior status as a retired judge.
[9] Id.- Retirement- Validity of Assignment.-Judges' Retirement Act, § 6, does not offend any constitutional provision on
ground that an assignment thereunder is an unlawful increase
in number of judges to county to which retired judge is assigned, since Constitution does not limit number of superior
court judges in any county.
[10] !d.-Retirement-Validity of Assignment.-The increase in
compensation provided in Judges' Retirement Act, § 6, to be
paid to retired judges while under assignment is not inconsistent with any constitutional provision, the compensation to
be paid to superior court judges being for Legislature to determine under Const., art. VI, § 17.
[11] !d.-Retirement-Effect of Assignment.-Const., art. VI, § 8,
providing that term of office of superior court judge shall be
six years, does not set at nought obvious purpose of assignment provisions of Judges' Retirement Act, since in no proper
sense is term of a judge extended by his retirement or by his
assignment after retirement.
[12] !d.-Retirement-Status of Retired Judge.-The fact that
under Judges' Retirement Act,§ 6, retired judge while receiving
retirement allowance is declared to be a judicial officer of the
state (but without any power as such except while under assigmnent) should be considered as nothing more than making
him eligible for assignment, since it would be unreasonable to
conclude that while not under assignment he would be subject
to conditions that attach to status and activities of an incumbent judge.
[13] !d.-Retirement-Status of Retired Judge.-When a retired
judge is assigned, he voluntarily assumes status of a regular
judge and would necessarily be governed by same conditions.
[14] Id.-Retirement-Prerequisites.-Under Judges' Retirement
Act no stipulation of counsel is required as a prerequisite to
assignment of retired superior court judge to preside as a
judge of superior court in any county in state, the provision
for stipulation of counsel in Const., art. VI, § 5, having by
its own terms to do only with establishment of court through
medium of a pro tempore judge, selected from membership of
the har by stipulation of counsel to try a particular case, and
whose selection must be approved by superior court.
[15] !d.-Retirement-Assignment and Service of Retired Judge.
-Const., art. VI, § la, making it duty of chairman of Judici:1l
Council to seek to expedite judicial business of state, to equal-
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ize work of judges, and to provide for assignment of incumbent judges from one county to another under certain conditions, does not prohibit assignment of a retired judge.
[16] !d.-Retirement-Assignment and Service of Retired Judge.
-Whether as a matter of policy the system of assignment of
retired judges should be put into effect is for people to determine through Constitution or by Legislature, and it is not
a matter subject to judicial control where it has been plainly
declared by legislative authority.
[17] !d.-Retirement-Status of Judge Trying Case Under Assignment.-A retired judge trying a case under assignment acts
as a judge de jure, and his conduct in trying case and rendering judgment therein cannot be questioned on appeal.
[18] Landlord and Tenant-Remedies of Tenant-Damages.Value of use of premises leased for operation of liquor business
from date of illegal reentry by lessors to end of lease term was
properly found to be $400 per month where there was evidence
that net income from business was over $7,000 for 12-month
period prior to unlawful reentry and that lease called for a
rental of $225 per month, and it was proper to award lessees an
additional $4,500 as damages for value of liquor license, where
there was evidence that liquor license alone was worth $10,000,
and that a separate price was fixed for use of premises (the
lease) and for sale of license and equipment under a conditional sale contract.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Sacramento County. James 0. Moncur, Judge.* Affirmed.
Consolidated actions for declaratory relief, and for damages for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Judgments
for respondents affirmed.
F. H. Bowers and Thomas F. Sargent for Appellants.
McAllister & Johnson and Walter C. Frame for Respondents.
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal from judgments in favor
of the Johnsons, husband and wife, for $4,500 and $15,400,
respectively, in actions consolidated for trial and on appeal.
The Pickens, husband and wife, commenced an action in
Sacramento County, for declaratory relief involving their
rights under a lease from the Pickens to the Johnsons of
premises owned by the Pickens. Their rights under a con*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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tract of conditional sale of the business and equipment on
the premises leased by the Pickens from the J ohnsons were
also involved. The J ohnsons brought an action in the same
court against the Pickens for damages for the forcible entry
and unlawful detainer of the premises. The actions were
consolidated for trial and tried without a jury.
Before approaching the merits of the appeal a preliminary
constitutional question raised by the Pickens must be disposed of.
The cases were tried before the Honorable J. 0. Moncur
who was elected in 1944 as judge of the Superior Court of
Plumas County for the full term of six years. He discharged
the duties of that office until the last day of his term (Jan.
8, 1951) when he retired pursuant to the provisions of the
Judges' Retirement Act (Stats. 1937, p. 2204). At the
time this consolidated action was tried Judge Moncur was
sitting in the Superior Court of Sacramento County pursuant
to an assignment to that task by the chairman of the Judicial
Council as provided in section 6 of the act as amended in
1951. (Stats. 1951, p. 3694.) At the time of the assignment that section provided, and still provides, in its pertinent
parts as follows :
"Sec. 6. Justices and judges retired under the provisions
of this act, so long as they are entitled by its provisions to
receive a retirement allowance, shall be judicial officers of the
State, but shall not exercise any of the powers of a justice
or judge except while under assignment to a court as hereinafter provided. Any such retired justice or judge may,
with his own consent, be assigned by the Chairman of the
,Judicial Council in a court of like jurisdiction as, or higher
jurisdiction than, that court from which he has retired;
and while so assigned shall have all the powers of a
justice or judge thereof. If assigned to sit in a court, he
shall be paid while sitting therein in addition to his retirement
allowances the difference, if any, between his retirement
allowance and the compensation of a judge of the court to
which he is assigned."
It is the contention of the Pickens that the foregoing
section of the Judges' Retirement Act is unconstitutional
and that any judgment rendered by Judge Moncur while
under assignment is void.
As authority for the adoption of the Judges' Retirement
Act and particularly section 6 as amended in 1951, reliance
is placed on section 22a of article IV of the Constitution
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adopted in 1930. The pertinent parts of that section are
as follows: ''The Legislature shall have power to provide
for the payment of retirement salaries to employees of the
State who shall qualify therefor by service in the work of
the State as provided by law. The Legislature shall have
power to fix and from time to time change the requirements
and conditions for retirement which shall include a minimum
period of service, a minimum attained age and minimum contribution of funds by such employees and such other conditions as the Legislature may prescribe. . . . ''
Under the authority of the foregoing constitutional section
the I1egislature in 1931 enacted the statute establishing a
system for the retirement of the employees of the state (Stats.
1931, p. 1442) and it has been in continuous operation since
that time.
In 1948 the question was presented to this court whether
section 22a of article IV of the Constitution conferred upon
the Legislature the power to provide a retirement system
for its own members. It was held in the case of Knight v.
Board of Administration of State Emp. R. System, 32 Cal.2d
400 [186 P.2d 547, 5 A.L.R.2d 410), that section 22a was an
enabling act; that the term ''employees'' included officers of
the state; that members of the Legislature were officers of
the state, and that under the section the Legislature was
authorized to establish a retirement system for its members
as provided for in the Legislators' Retirement Law of 1947.
(Gov. Code, § 9350 et seq. ; Stats. 1947, p. 2058.) The validity
of that statute was upheld by unanimous decision of this
court.
[1] There can be no doubt that section 22a as construed
in the Knight case was and is an enabling provision of the
Constitution authorizing the Legislature to provide a system
for the retirement of the members of the judicial department
of the state embraced within the Judges' Retirement Law.
In fact, there is here no contention to the contrary. That
act, as stated, was adopted in 1937. Section 6 was then in
its present form with the exception of a provision added
by amendment in 1951. The section was first amended in
1941 (Stats. 1941, p. 2938) to provide that there must be
a stipulation in the case by all counsel that the retired judge
could act. In 1951 the section was again amended by unanimous vote of both houses of the Legislature. (Assembly
Daily Journal, May 18, 1951, p. 4501; Senate Daily Journal,
June 16, 1951, p. 3462.) By that amendment the require-
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ment of a stipulation of counsel was eliminated and a provision added for compensation to the retired judge while under
assignment based on the difference between his retirement
allowance and the compensation of a judge of the court to
which he is assigned. (Stats. 1951, p. 3694.)
For a period of 15 years and over, and until the judgment
in this case in August, 1952, the system of assignment of
retired judges to try cases in the superior court has been
in operation without objection.
Thus, at all times since the enactment of the Judges' Retirement Act in 1937 section 6 thereof has contained the provision
that a retired judge should be a judicial officer of the state
and also the provision granting to the Legislature power
"from time to time" to "change the requirements and conditions for retirement.'' This the Legislature has done in
the two instances mentioned and the question is whether
the conditions iu the original enactment and those subsequently incorporated in it were within the power of the
Legislature to enact. If it be concluded that they bear a
reasonable relation to a system of retirement of judges and
do not offend any provision of the Constitution they should
be upheld. It is our conclusion that they are valid from
both standpoints.
'rhis type of legislation, both constitutional and statutory,
is not new in this state. The Public Utilities Commission
has been established under a constitutional enabling act with
full power conferred on the Legislature to enact legislation
even contrary to any other provisions of the Constitution,
provided it be cognate and germane to the regulation and
control of public utilities. ( Const., art. XII, § 22; Pacific
1'el. & 1'el. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640 [137 P. 1119, Ann.
Cas. 1915C 822, 50 L.R.A.N.S. 652].) Likewise the Industrial Accident Commission has been set up under an enabling
act whereby the Legislature is expressly vested with plenary
power ''unlimited by any provision of this Constitution, to
create, and enforce a complete system of workmen's compensation . . . . " ( Const., art. XX, § 21; Western Metal Supply
Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407 [156 P. 491, Ann.Cas. 1917E
390] .)
Under the foregoing enabling acts the Legislature has
enacted laws which, as interpreted by the courts, are controlling, as to the subjects properly legislated upon, over
other general provisions of the Constitution and general laws.
So here the Constitution has in general terms conferred
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upon the Legislature the power to establish a system for
the retirement of judges. The Legislature has done so and
has imposed as a condition of retirement that retired judges,
so long as they receive retirement allowances, shall continue
to be judicial officers of the state and with their permission
shall be subject to call for judicial service by assignment
for that purpose by the chairman of the Judicial Council.
[2] It would seem to be beyond question that the provision for the assignment and service of a retired judge in
accordance with the statute bears a reasonable relationship
to a system of judges' retirement. It is inherently connected
with the problems of the administration of justice under which
the state, in consideration for the retirement allowance, may
invoke the assistance of the retired personnel of the judicial
department in emergencies found to exist by the chairman
of the Judicial Council. Nothing foreign to that purpose
could have been in contemplation by the Legislature.
It is recognized that the constitutional grant of power to the
Legislature to establish the two commissions above referred to
is much more comprehensive than that contained in section
22a of article IV, and it is taken for granted that any legislation adopted under the authority of that section must not be
inconsistent with other provisions of the Constitution.
[3] There is no provision of the Constitution which would
prohibit the Legislature from providing, as it has in section
6, that so long as he receives a retirement allowance a retired
judge shall be a judicial officer of the state. Section 1 of
article VI which provides that the judicial power of the
state shall be vested in the senate, sitting as a court of
impeachment, and in the several courts. including the superior
court, deals with the question of the official entities in which
the judicial power of the state shall be vested and not ,,·ith
the personnel of those institutions. And it must be assmnP(l
that an assigned retired superior court judge is possrssf'rl
of all of the qualifications otherwise acquired for serviee on
that court, including the requirement of section 23 of article
VI of the Constitution that he shall have been aomittro to prnetice in this state for at lf'ast five years before becoming a
superior court judge.
\Vith that assumption it is observed that here we are dPaling with the status of a superior eourt judge who has retired
pursuant to the provisions of the statute. [4] fn order to
retire he must, while in office, file his notice of retirement
with the Secretary of State as provided by section 1 of the
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act. (Stats. 1937, p. 2204.) [5] While in retirement he
has the privilege of maintaining his membership in the State
Bar of California. .1""s such he is entitled to all of the privileges and immunities and is subject to the duties and obligations of an attorney at law so long as he maintains his
membership in the State Bar organization. His term of
office as a judge has expired, or been terminated prior thereto
by his voluntary act, and the office is vacant. He may go
and come in all respects as any attorney and counselor at
law but he has no power as a judicial officer until the happening of a contingency, namely, his assignment and voluntary acceptance thereof as a judge of the superior court in
and for a designated county by the chairman of the Judicial
Council. [6] That assignment does not prolong his term
of office. It merely has the effect of vesting in him the
powers of a judge of the superior court during the period
specified in the assignment, as is ordinarily done in the
case of an assignment by the chairman of the Judicial Council
of an incumbent superior court judge from one county· to
another under the authority of section la of article VI of
the Constitution. [7] It must be taken for granted that
under the proper exercise of the power of assignment a
retired judge will not be continued in service indefinitely.
The term of assignment is necessarily within the wise discretion of the chairman of the Judicial Council. [8] Upon
the expiration of the period of his assignment the judge
resumes his prior status as a retired judge. If he desires
to exercise the privileges of an attorney during his retirement and while unassigned, he would, of course, be subject
to the provisions of the State Bar Act, including the requirement of the payment of dues.
[9] It is also observed that section 6 of the Judges' Retirement Act does not offend any provision of the Constitution
on the ground that an assignment thereunder is an unlawful
increase in the number of judges of the county to which the
retired judge is assigned. The Constitution does not limit
the number of superior court judges in any county. The
Legislature has full control of the number (two-thirds in
both houses voting in favor thereof, § 9, art. VI) and section 6 of the retirement act is legislative authority for additional sessions of court for the particular county to which
the assignment is made ( §§ 6 and 9, art. VI).
[10] Again, the increase in compensation provided for in
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section 6 of the act to be paid to retired judges while under
assignment is not inconsistent with any provision of the
Constitution. The compensation to be paid to superior court
judges is for the Legislature to determine under section 17
of article VI of the Constitution.
[11] Section 8 of article VI, providing that the term of
office of a superior court judge shall be six years, and cases
such as Martello v. SupM·ior Court, 202 Cal. 400 [261 P.
476], holding that a judicial officer may not perform a valid
judicial act after his term has expired, do not set at nought
the obvious purpose of the assignment provisions of the
Judges' Retirement Act. In no proper sense is the term
of a judge extended by his retirement or by his assignment.
Upon his retirement he can no longer of his own volition
assume to act as a judge whether he retires at the end of
his term, as in this case, or in his midterm. It is only upon
his assignment in accordance with a statute as authorized
by the Constitution that he has any judicial power whatsoever, and since it is correct to say that the assignment has
a reasonable relationship to the system of retirement with
no rights in the retired judge to act except under the assignment, there has been no unlawful extension of his term of
office.
[12] The fact that under section 6 of the act the retired
judge while receiving retirement allowance is declared to
be a judicial officer of the state (but without any power as
such except while under assignment) should be considered
as nothing more than making him eligible for assignment.
It would be unreasonable to conclude that while not under
assignment he would be subject to the conditions that attach to the status and aetivities of an incumbent judge.
[13] When assigned he voluntarily assumes the status of
a regular judge and would necessarily be governed by those
conditions. For example, when under assignment he could
not practice law ( Const., art. VI, § 18), and could not be
absent from the state longer than 60 days ( Const., art. VI,
§ 9). Others could be noted. While not under assignment
there is no good reason to say that he would be subject to
the provisions of the Constitution and law of the state made
specially applicable to regular incumbent judges.
As hereinbefore indicated there was no provision in the
original Judges' Retirement Act of 1937 requiring a stipulation of counsel that the assigned retired judge might act.
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(Stats. 1937, p. 2206.) In 1941 section 6 of the act was
amended to provide that, ''Any such retired justice or judge
may, with his own consent, and upon the stipulation of all
the counsel in the case or cases to which he is assigned to sit,
be assigned by the chairman of the Judicial Council to sit
in any court; and while so assigned shall have all the powers
of a justice or judge thereof.'' ( Stats. 1941, p. 2938.) In
1951 this section was again amended by eliminating the
requirement of a stipulation of counsel before the order of
assignment could be made. (Stats. 1951, p. 3694.)
It is again emphasized that we are here dealing with the
assignment of a retired judge of the superior court to sit
in a superior court. Such being the case it is urged that,
notwithstanding the amendment of section 6 in 1951, dispensing with the requirement of a stipulation of counsel, nevertheless such a stipulation as to the assignment of a superior
court judge is required under the provisions of section 5
of article VI of the Constitution as amended in 1928. The
amendment added in that year is as follows: "Upon stipulation of the parties litigant or their attorneys of record a
cause in the superior court or in a municipal court may be
tried by a judge pro tempore who must be a member of the
bar sworn to try the cause, and who shall be empowered to
act in such capacity in the cause tried before him until the
final determination thereof. The selection of such judge
pro tempore shall be subject to the approval and order of
the court in which said cause is pending and shall also be
subject to such regulations and orders as may be prescribed
by the Judicial Council.''
[14] It is argued that since section 22 of article I of the
Constitution provides that: '' 'l'he provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express
words they are declared to be otherwise,'' there is no power
in the Legislature to provide for the assignment of a retired
superior court judge to act as a judge of such a court except
by stipulation of counsel, accompanied by an order of the
superior court approving the selection.
A sufficient answer to this argument is that the Constitution
and the statute do not encompass the same subject matter
and that there is no conflict between them. Section 5 of
article VI of the Constitution, by its own terms, has to do
only with the establishment of a court through the medium
of a pro tempore judge, selected from the membership of
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the bar by stipulation of counsel to try a particular case,
and whose selection must be approved by the superior court.
'l'he chairman of the Judicial Council has nothing to do with
setting up such a court. On the other hand section 6 of
the Judges' Hetirement .Act operates to establish a court
through the medium of a judicial officer of the state and his
assignment thereto by the chairman of the Judicial Council.
Where duly assigned under that section such officer obviously
is not a judge pro tempore selected by stipulation of counsel
to try a particular case as contemplated by section 5 of article
VI of the Constitution. The latter section operates independently of the retirement act. Neither controls the other.
·when a retired judge is duly assigned under the retirement
act he is a regular judge of the superior court whose status
as such is created by the Legislature pursuant to constitutional authority. Section 5 of article VI is therefore not
controlling. It necessarily follows that under the retirement
statute no stipulation of counsel is required as a prerequisite
to the assignment of a retired superior court judge to preside
as a judge of the superior court in any county in the state.
It may not be assumed that the power of assignment conferred by section 6 of the statute will be improvidently exercised. If perchance it should be the Legislature has complete
authority to deal with the subject by appropriate legislation
even to the extent of withdrawing the power altogether.
[15] By section la of article VI (subd. 6) of the Constitution the duty is enjoined upon the chairman of the Judicial
Council to seek to expedite the judicial business of the state,
to equalize the work of the judges, and to provide for the
assignment of incumbent judges from one county to another
under certain conditions. None of the conditions specified
in that section would prohibit the assignment here under
consideration.
[1'6] Whether as a matter of policy the system of assignment of retired judges should be put into effect is for the
people of the state to determine through the Constitution or
by the Legislature. That policy has been declared by both,
by the Constitution by reasonable implication and by the
I-1egislature in the unmistakable and definite terms of section
6 of the retirement act. 'fhe public policy so reflected is of
eonsiderable public concern. It is not a matter which is
subject to judicial control where it has been plainly declared
by legislative authority. A plan for the continued service
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of federal judges has been in effect for many years. (28
U.S.C.A. § 294 [:formerly § 375a] ; Booth v. United States,
291 U.S. 339 [54 S.Ct. 379, 78 L.Ed. 836] ; United States v.
Moore, 101 F.2d 56, cert.den., 306 U.S. 664 [59 S.Ct. 788,
83 L.Ed. 1060] .) The purpose of such a plan would seem
to be to make available to the judicial department the experience, aptitude and capabilities of retired judges who,
with their consent, may be called upon for assistance in the
administration of justice. Such a plan is highly desirable
not only in particular cases but also when congestion in
judicial business in a particular locality has become critical,
and oftentimes intolerable.
The chairman of the Judicial Council is the logical constitutional officer in whom to vest the power of assignment.
It is one of his functions to marshal the judicial manpower
o£ the state by assignment and transfer of judges to facilitate
the dispatch of judicial business. No other person is in better
or as good a position as he to determine the desirability and
need for such assistance.
[17] From the foregoing it is concluded that while the
trial judge in these cases was acting under the assignment
he was acting as a judge de jure. There is no question but
that if he were not, the status of a judge de facto attached
to his action. The office to which he was assigned was a
de jure office. By acting under regular assignment under
a statute authorizing it he was acting under color o£ authority
as provided by law. His conduct in trying the cases and
rendering judgment therein cannot here be questioned.
(People v. J{empley, 205 Cal. 441 [271 P. 478], and cases
there cited.) But the fact that those judgments may not
be attacked for disqualification of the trial judge because
he acted at least as a judge de facto is not enough. The
question whether he acted as a de jure judge is essential
to the proper disposition of this case especially for the proper
functioning of the retirement system and the regularity of
the action of assigned judges thereunder.
Since it is determined that the judgments herein may
not be assailed on the ground that the trial judge was without
power to act under the assignment, we turn to the merits
of the appeal. From the record it appears that the Pickens
were the owners of a business (including an on-sale liquor
license) and equipment and the property on which it was
located. In 1948, the parties made a conditional contract

Mar. 1954]

PICKENS

v.

JoHNSON

411

( 42 C.2d 399; 267 P.2d 8011

of sale in which the Pickens were the sellers of the business
and personal property used therewith for the sum of $10,000
to be paid in stated installments, and of which $5,000 was
paid. At the same time, the Pickens leased by written lease
the real property on which the business was located for a
five-year term commencing January 5, 1948, at a monthly
rental of $225, the first and last month of which were paid
in advance. The Johnsons took possession of the property
under the agreements and they retained possession until
September 20, 1949.
In the course of operating the business, the Johnsons incurred obligations to third persons for which an action was
commenced against them in the municipal court. An attachment was issued in that action against ''goods, wares and
merchandise" of the Johnsons located on the leased property.
On September 14, 1949, the marshal levied the attachment
on such ''goods, wares and merchandise'' by posting notice
on the premises where located and padlocking the doors of
the building. Hunter, an employee of the Johnsons, was
then in charge of the business. He operated the bar at the
business on September 15th under the marshal's direction.
He left the premises on September 19th and when he returned
on the 20th, the marshal's padlocks had been replaced by
other padlocks, and the Pickens were in possession, having
entered on that day, removing the marshal's padlocks. At
that time, all sums payable under the lease and agreement
had been paid by the Johnsons according to the instruments.
The rent had been paid to and including October 10, 1949,
and on that date the J ohnsons' tender of the rent for the
ensuing month was refused by the Pickens. Other factors
show that the Pickens asserted and held possession of the
premises to the exclusion of the J ohnsons.
In the first of the two consolidated actions, the Pickens',
plaintiffs', basic claims were that the Johnsons had violated the
lease by suffering the attachment to be levied and incurring
the obligations on which the attachment was based in their
name and on their credit; that hence the lease was breached
and it and the agreement were no longer in effect and they
were entitled to regain possession of the premises and business.
In the second action, the ,J ohnsons, plaintiffs, claimed damages from the Pickens for ousting and excluding them from
possession of the premises and business, asserting no breach

412

r42 c.2d

of the lease or agreement and ref;ting their claim on those
instrnments.
'l'hc~ i'Ollrt t"onnd that thPl'P had been no br<'ach of the
lPasn or agreemnnt; that the merchandise was not bought
in the Pickrns' name or on their credit; that the levy of
the attachment did not breach the lease; that the Pickens
ousted and excluded the J ohnsons from possession without
right; that the J ohnsons had not abandoned the premises
or their rights under the lease ; and that the Pickens were
liable in damages to the J ohnsons for their conduct.
The actions were previously tried resulting in a judgment
for the Pickens, and the J ohnsons were ordered to transfer
the liquor license to the Pickens. That was done and in the
second trial $4,500 of the damages awarded to the Johnsons was the found value of the liquor license. An appeal
was taken from the judgment after the :first. trial, the main
grounds being insufficiency of the evidence to support it.
'l'he judgment was reversed on that ground and several matters were determined. (Pickens v. Johnson, 107 Cal.App.2d
778 [238 P.2d 40].) The Pickens based their claim of a
violation of the lease on a clause in which the J ohnsons,
lessees, agreed not to permit any liens to be :filed against
the premises, asserting the levy of the attachment as a violation, and further invoked a clause of the lease which gave
them right of reentry for breach. The District Court of
Appeal held that there vvas no breach becallSe the attachment
was of merchandise, rather than of premises. It was also
determined that under the evidence the ,Johnsons did not
incur the obligations upon which the attachment was based
in the Pickens' name or credit and the J ohnsons had not
abandoned the premises, their lease, or the agreement.
The Pickens assert on this appeal that they were justified
in seizing possession of the premises and taking the liquor
license from the wall on the premises, or otherwise phrased,
the findings of the court to the contrary are not supported
by the evidence. They assert that the Johnsons abandoned
the premises and that an improper measnre of damages was
applied.
\Ve have heretofore Reen that it was settled by the former
appeal (P1:ckens v . .Johnson, snpra, 107 Cal.App.2d 778) that
there was no breach of the lease by reason of the levy of
the attachment and hence the Pickens had no right to reenter
or retain possession of the premises and merchandise on that
ground.
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The Pickens concede that there is a conflict in the evidence
on the question of abandonment of the lease and agreement
by the ,J ohnsons and the court in its findings resolved that
conflict against them. Thus there is no occasion to discuss
the evidence on the subject.
For the first time the Pickens now contend that the business and the premises were a part of a joint enterprise
between them and the Johnsons and therefore they had the
right to enter and retain possession of the premises and
merchandise. They point to evidence that the liquor license
was issued in the J ohnsons' and their names jointly and that
they were parties defendant in the municipal court action and
judgment was then given against them as well as the Johnsons.
No such proposition was asserted in any of the pleadings or
at any other ti1r~e. Moreover, the lease and agreement
squarely refute it. They created a landlord-tenant relation
with reference to the premises and the liquor license was
one of the things sold by the agreement to the ,J ohnsons.
At no time prior to their entry into possession in September
did they make any such claim.
The Pickens contend they had a right to enter to
obtain the liquor license in order to turn it over to the Board
of Equalization as the law required them to do to protect
their interest because the failure to operate the business
·would forfeit the license and that is the reason they entered.
Assuming such was the case it would not authorize them to
foreibly seize possession of the premises and merchandise
and retain them to the exclusion of the J ohnsons. There is
evidence which negatives that as the purpose of their entry.
·while there is some conflict, the evidence shows that the
Pickens broke the padlocks which had been placed on the
door by the marshal and put their own locks on. The Pickens
thereupon took possession of the premises. They removed
some merchandise therefrom and took down decorations and
rmovated it. After the attachment was levied on September
14, 1949, the premises were open with a keeper in charge
for two days and then padlocked. The Pickens told the
,Johnsons' bartender who was residing at the premises to
remove his personal articler-;. The ~Tohnsons had made arrangements with a Mrs. Sprouse to borrow the money to
discharge the attachment but when she found out the Pickens
were in possession she refused to advance it. Mrs. Johnson
temlerecl the rent due under the lease on October 10, 1949,
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to the Pickens and demanded possession of the premises;
both were refused. Similar tenders and demands were made
on November lOth. Also, the Pickens refused to permit the
,Johnsons to remove their personal belongings. The Pickens
posted a notice dated September 14, 1949, on the premises
declaring that because of the attachment the J ohnsons had
broken the lease and agreement (which as we have seen was
not true) and unless the attachment was released in three
days the J ohnsons would lose all rights under the lease and
agreement. Finally, the Pickens commenced their action on
October 28, 1949, in which they declared that the lease and
agreement were broken and they took possession of the property on September 20, 1949, and requested the court to
declare that the J ohnsons had no right to the property.
'fhere is, therefore, sufficient evidence to show an ouster
by the Pickens of the Johnsons from the premises, an exclusion of the ,Johnsons from possession and a forcible entry by
the Pickens, all contrary to the J ohnsons' rights under the
lease and agreement.
[18] The damages of $19,900 awarded the Johnsons consisted of $4,500 for the liquor license and $15,400 for the
loss of possession of the premises in violation of the lease.
It was found that the value of the use of the premises which
is the rental value from September 20, 1949, to January 5,
1953, the end of the lease term, was $400 per month. Evidently the court concluded that this ran from October 21,
1949. The rental under the lease was $225 per month but
no claim is made that such amount should be deducted from
the $400 use value. 'rhe Pickens assert that the only evidence
of the use value was based on the assumption that the liquor
license would be used on the premises and that to permit
recovery of such a use value and also the value of the liquor
license is to allow two amounts of damages for the same thing.
There is evidence that the net income from the business
was over $7,000 for the 12-month period prior to the unlawful
entry and there was evidence that the liquor license alone
was worth $10,000. It will be recalled that the lease called
for a rental of $225 per month and independent of that the
price of the equipment including the license in the agreement
was $10,000. It is true that the lease and agreement should
be read together, and it was contemplated· that the license
be used on the leased premises, but a separate price was
fixed for the use of the premises (the lease) and the sale
of the license and equipment under the agreement. Taking
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into consideration the net profit from the business together
with the rental price stated in the lease, the court could have
properly concluded, as it did, that the value of the use of
the premises was $400 per month.
The judgments are affirmed.
Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., and Dooling, J. pro
tern., ;c, concurred.
Dooling, J. pro tern., sat in place of the Chief Justice, who
deemed himself disqualified.
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in
the judgment on the ground that J. 0. Moncur was a de facto
judge and that no error was committed; hence the judgment
should be affirmed. But I cannot agree with the holding of
the majority that a retired justice or judge may be a de jure
justice or judge, or that the Judges' Retirement Act (Stats.
1937, p. 2204, as amended) is constitutional insofar as it
purports to authorize a justice or judge whose term of office
has expired to act in a judicial capacity without, at least,
the consent of the parties.
1'he fallacy of the majority holding in this respect is apparent. In effect the majority holds that section 22a of
article IV of the Constitution which empowers the Legislature to provide for retirement salaries for state employees
modifies or repeals all provisions of the Constitution relating
to the selection, terms of office and extrajudicial activities of
justices or judges. (See Cal. Const., art IV, §§ 18 and 20;
art. VI, §§ 3, 8, 9, 10, lOa, 18 and 26.) The majority holding
also nullifies section 1 of article III of the Constitution
providing for the separation of the powers of the state
government.
Under the majority holding, the Legislature may, pursuant to section 22a of article IV, extend the term of office
of a superior court judge beyond a period of six years fixed
by article VI, section 8, of the Constitution and may extend
the term of office of a member of the Supreme Court or
District Court of Appeal beyond the 12-year period fixed
by article VI, sections 3 and 4a, of the Constitution. This
is obvious because, under this holding a justice or judge
whose term of office has expired, is still a justice or judge
although he is entitled to practice law in violation of article
VI, section 18, of the Constitution. The chairman of the
*Assigned by Acting Chairman of Judicial Council.
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.Judicial Council by some magic may assign this practicing
lawyer-jnsticc or judge to the position of a de jure justice
or judge fol' snch pt~riod as such chairman and such lawyerjustiee or judge may decide between themselves. ff a client
should consult sueh a lawyer- justice or judge while he is
under assignment, I prPsume the latter would say: "While
I was a lawyer and entitled to practice law before this assignment, I am now a justice or judge and not entitled to
practice law during this assignment, but when I finish this
assignment I will again be a lawyer entitled to practice law,
and I can then act as your lawyer.'' ·while under such
assignment and acting as such justice or judge he is not
permitted to give legal advice, accept employment or compensation for any service performed as a lawyer. After the
assignment is ended, he resumes the practice of law until
the next assignment, or he may seek a public office or fill
some public position in violation of article IV, section 20,
and article VI, section 18, of the Constitution. He may
decide to take a journey out of the state but if he is out
of the state for a period of longer than 60 days he violates
article VI, section 9, of the Constitution. Suppose a retired
justice or judge should be elected a district attorney, a city
attorney, a member of the Legislature, or some other public
office. Obviously under settled principles of constitutional
law he would not be eligible for assignment to a de jure
judicial position. Would this mean that he would lose his
retirement salary as he would not be available to accept
an assignment to a judicial position by the chairman of the
Judicial Council? We would then have the unique situation that some retired justices or judges would be eligible
for assignment and others would not. The assignment by
the chairman of the Judicial Council of such a lawyer-justice
or judge may be for one day or one year or 10 years for
service upon any court which such chairman and such retired
lawyer-justice or judge may agree upon. All this without
popular sanction and in direct violation of constitutional
mandates. Just the chairman of the Judicial Council and
this lawyer-justicr, or judge determine when he is a lawyer
and when he is a judge and where he will sit when he is a
judge. When he is a lawyer he is subject to the provisions
of the State Bar Act and must pay his State Bar dues. When
he is a justice or judge he is subject to the above cited
constitutional provisions with respect to his extrajudicial
activities. He may be a lawyer one day and justice or judge
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the next. As a lawyer he is an advocate----a partisan-a
(;onfidential adviser of his clients. As a ;jnf1ge he is required
to weigh and consider the evidence and the law and render
a fair and impartial decision. As a justice or judge he has
no fixed term of office except the period of assignment which
may or may not be renewed at the discretion of the chairman
of the Judicial Council. In fact, he does not know from
one day to another whether he is to be a judge or a lawyer.
In short, he must have a dual or split personality to qualify
for these dual positions overnight.
In describing the type of judge created by section 6 of
the Judges' Retirement Act the majority opinion states :
"On the other hand section 6 of the Judges' Retirement Act
operates to establish a court through the medium of a judicial
officer of the state and his assignment thereto by the chairman
of the Judicial Council. Where duly assigned under that
section such officer obviously is not a judge pro tempore
selected by stipulation of counsel to try a particular case
as contemplated by section 5 of article VI of the Constitution.
'l'he latter section operates independently of the retirement
act. Neither controls the other. When a retired judge is
duly assigned under the retirement act he is a regular judge
of the superior court whose status as such is created by the
Legislature pursuant to constitutional authority. Section 5
of article VI is therefore not controlling. It necessarily follows that under the retirement statute no stipulation of
counsel is required as a prerequisite to the assignment of a
retired superior court judge to preside as a judge of the
superior court in any county in the state.''
It is obvious from a reading of the foregoing excerpt from
the majority opinion that the majority reasons from a false
premise; that is, the majority assumes that a retired justice
or judge whose term of office has expired is "a judicial officer
of the state.'' This assumption is made notwithstanding the
previous statement in said opinion as follows: "In no proper
sense is the term of a judge extended by his retirement or
by his assignment. Upon his retirement he can no longer
of his own volition assume to act as a judge whether he
retires at the end of his term, as in this case, or in his midterm . . . . ·while not under assignment there is no good
reason to say that he would be subject to the provisions of
the Constitution and law of the state made specially applicable to regular incumbent judges.'' In other words, when
42 C.2d-14
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not under assignment, the retired justice or judge is returned
to the status of a lawyer-a member of the State Bar, if he
pays his dues, and is entitled to practice law. How, may
I ask, is his status any different from that of any other lawyer
or member of the Bar, and what magic has transformed him
from a lawyer or member of the Bar into ''a judicial officer
of the state?" Finally, can it be said that a person may have
the status of both a member of the
entitled to practice
law, and that of "a judicial officer of the state," at one and
the same time? To so hold is to overrule State Bar of California v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 323 [278 P. 432], where
it was held by a unanimous court as follows (p. 340): "The
duly elected and qualified judges of the courts of record
in this state who were such at the time said act became
effective and who have since become and are such judicial
officers were and are not, under the inhibition of section 22
of article VI of the state constitution, entitled to practice
law in this state during their and each of their continuance
in office, and hence under the express provisions of said State
Bar Act have not become and during said period are not
members of 'l'he State Bar of California, and hence are not
subject to the jurisdiction, control and processes conferred
upon said corporation and the governing board or other officers
thereof by the scope and provisions of said act.''
The majority opinion also states: "It may not be assumed
that the power of assignment conferred by section 6 of the
statute will be improvidently exercised. If perchance it
should be the Legislature has complete authority to deal with
the subject by appropriate legislation even to the extent of
withdrawing the power altogether.''
This pronouncement strikes a lethal blow at section 1, article III, of the Constitution known as the separation of powers
mandate. Under the majority holding the Legislature, in
violation of this mandate, may say to retired justices or
judges whose terms of office have expired: "You must continue to serve as justices or judges whenever and wherever
we (the Legislature) direct or yon may not serve at allyou may or you may not practice law or hold other positionsin other words, you retired justices and judges are under
our control and you must obey our mandates.'' Obviously,
if the Legislature may provide that retired justices or judges
may be assigned to a judicial position with their consent,
it may also provide that they must serve in such judicial
positions without their consent and may provide sanctions
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for their failure to so serve. rrhis may not set wen with
even some retired Supreme and appellate court justices who
may desire to engage in extrajudicial activities. They may
then remember the trite saying with mixed metaphors :
"'When chickens come home to roost it's a horse of another
color."
Another serious result which may flow from the majority
holding in this case is that a justice or judge eligible for
retirement under the Judges' Retirement Act may be defeated at an election to succeed himself and then retire under
the act before his term expires. Under the majority holding
here such justice or judge may be assigned by the chairman
of the Judicial Council to sit as a justice or judge in any
court in which he may be eligible to sit under the act and
thus he may continue to function as a justice or judge indefinitely and thereby thwart the will of the electors. I can
envision a situation such as this arising in the smaller counties of the state which have only one or two judges and
where the defeated retired judge may be so unpopular that
he has lost the confidence and respect of a large segment
of the population who constitute his constituents. Yet the
chairman of the Judicial Council with the consent of such
retired judge could foist him onto the people of that county
as a judge of the superior court for an indefinite period by
the power of assignment which the majority now hold the
chairman of the Judicial Council possesses. I believe there
can be no refutation of the statement that when the people
of this state adopted section 22a of article IV of the Constitution at the general election in 1930 not a single soul who
voted :for this amendment ever contemplated the far-reaching
consequences of their act as now construed by a majority of
this court.
The majority refers to section 5, article VI, of the Constitution which authorizes the appointment of a judge pro
tempore by stipulation of the parties approved by a judge
of the superior court. While this provision has been in the
Constitution in one form or another since 1879 its use has
been very limited. In my 26 years of law practice, I never
knew of it being used, and in the more than 14 years that
l have been a member of this court, I do not recall a
Bingle case coming before this court which had been heard
and decided by a judge pro tempore selected under this
provision of the Constitution. I mention this only to call
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attention to the fact that it must be the feeling of lawyers
and litigants alike that they prefer to have their controversies
settled by judges selected in accordance with the constitutional
provisions hereinabove cited, and if I am not mistaken the
Bar of this state will revolt against the holding of this court
which places it within the power of the chairman of the
Judicial Counsel and a retired justice or judge to create
the judicial tribunal which has the power to determine the
rights of the litigants in controversies which may involve
their life, liberty, or property in violation of the constitutional
mandates which I have heretofore cited.
Much is said in the majority opinion in regard to the
desirability of the legislation contained in section 6 of the
Judges' Retirement Act. In this respect the majority opinion
states : ''The purpose of such a plan would seem to be to
make available to the judicial department the experience,
aptitude and capabilities of retired judges who, with their
consent, may be called upon for assistance in the administration of justiee. Sueh a plan is highly desirable not only
in partieular cases but also when eongestion in judicial business in a particular loeality has beeome critieal, and oftentimes intolerable." Assuming, without conceding, the factual
correctness of the foregoing statement, I have grave doubt
as to its wisdom even though it were possible by any reasonable or logical analysis to extend the provisions of section
22a of article IV of the Constitution to authorize the adoption
of such a plan. While it is no doubt true that some retired
justices or judges may be well qualified to continue functioning in a judicial capacity, it is likewise true that some
are not. vVe certainly have the right to assume that when
a judge voluntarily retires, he desires to be relieved of the
duties of his judicial office, as retirement means just that.
The Legislature has the power under the Constitution to create
a sufficient number of superior court judgeships to enable
our superior courts to expeditiously handle all legal matters
coming before our courts, and it seems to me much more
appropriate for the Legislature to exercise this power than
to resort to the hybrid type of legislation contained in
section 6 of the Judges' Retirement Act.
In this case there is no question that Moncur, the judge
who purported to act as such in these consolidated cases, was
not a legal judge. The term of office for which he had been
elected had expired. He did not run for office again but
on the contrary retired as he was authorized to do under
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the retirement act. A successor had been chosen for his
office, a superior court judge in Plumas County. It is true
l1e was regularly
to act as a judge in these cases
by the chairman of the ,Judicial Cormcil but he was not qualified for that position.
There are several constitutional obstacles to his being a
de jure judge or to the power of the Legislature under the
retirement act or otherwise to authorize such procedure.
The Constitution requires that judges of superior courts
shall be elected by the voters of the county in which is situated the superior court for which the judge is to be chosen
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6), but that in case of a vacancy
in the effice, the Governor shall appoint a person to hold
the office until the commencement of the term of a person
elected to fill the vacancy which shall be done at the general
election next after the first day in ,January after the vacancy
occurs, and his term (six years) shall commence on the first
Monday of Jan nary after the first day of January next succeeding his election. The term of office is six years. (Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 8.) Under these provisions it has been
held that a purported judicial act done by a judge after
his term of office has expired has no force or effect. (Martello
v. Superior Co~td, 202 Cal. 400 [261 P. 476] ; Connolly v.
Ashworth, 98 Cal. 205 [33 P. 601 ; Mace v. O'Reilley, 70 Cal.
231 [11 P. 721]; B1·oder v. Conklin, 98 Cal. 360 [33 P. 211];
People v. Ruef, 14 Cal.App. 576, 630 [114 P. 48, 54].) The
J_~egislature cannot extend the term of a judge fixed by the
Constitution (People v. Campbell, 138 Cal. 11, 16 [70 P.
918] ; People v. Markham, 104 Cal. 232, 235 [37 P. 918])
nor confer ?tpon him judicial power after his term has exp1:red, where the Constitution fixes his term of office and
mode of selection. (Hallam v. Tillinghast, 19 Wash. 20 [52
P. 329].)
From the above constitutional provision and authorities
it is clear that Moncur was not a judge when the cases were
tried and any judicial act done by him was ineffective. He
had been elected a superior judge but his term had expired
on the day he retired and he was not reelected; his successor
had previously been elected and was discharging the duties
of that office. Moncur did not hold an appointment by the
Governor to fill a vacancy. That is, he was in no different
position than a judge who did not run for reelection or did
run and was defeated; his term had expired and his successor
was occupying the position. Hence if there are no other
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provisions justifying a different result, section 6 of the
Judges' Retirement
which
retired judges to
serve as judges after retirement, at least without the stipulation of the parties, is invalid.
Moreover, the effect of permitting the Legislature to authorize judges who are not judges (retired judges to act as such
[the retirement act] ) violates the fundamental premise of
our Constitution that the legislative, judicial and executive
departments of our state government shall be separate. (Cal.
Const., art. III, § 1.) If the Legislature may at its sole
discretion thwart the provisions in the Constitution for the
judiciary then there is no longer any true separation of
power. Section 6 of the retirement act does just that, because
it empowers the chairman of the Judicial Council to create
offices of superior court judges where none may exist under
the Constitution and in a manner contrary to it.
To overcome the positive constitutional provisions fixing
the term of office and mode of selection of superior court
judges, the majority opinion proceeds on the theory that the
constitutional provisions authorizing the Legislature to establish a retirement system (Cal. Const., art. IV,§ 22a) are paramount to the former provisions and that the Legislature may
enact measures contrary to them. It stresses the constitutional
authority of the chairman of the Judicial Council to assign
judges from one area to another, and a retired judge is not
a judge until after he has been assigned to serve by the
chairman and then only during the assignment.
In reaching that result an analogy is sought to be drawn
between the powers granted by the Constitution to the Public
Utilities Commission and Industrial Accident Commission.
First, with reference to the assignment authority provision,
it is crystal clear that that provision does not purport to
repeal the requirement that judges be elected for a fixed
term ; in case of vacancy and before election the Governor
must make an appointment, not the chairman of the Judicial
Council. Under the Judicial Council provision it will be
noted that ''any judge'' may be assigned, but in order to
derive authority therefrom to assign a retired judge, it would
be necessary to conclude that the words mean any person,
whether or not he is still a judge in the proper legal sense
that he has been elected or appointed under the constitutional
provisions above discussed, and his term has not expired. To
so construe those words is out of harmony with the rule
announced in Fay v. District Court of Appeal, 200 Cal. 522,

Mar. 1954]

PICKENS

v.

JoHNSON

423

[42 C.2d 399; 267 P.2d BOll

536 [254 P. 896], in holding that amendment to the Constitution with reference to judges pro tempore did not mean
that the entire judicial personnel of a District Court of
Appeal could consist of pro tempore judges. In Edler v.
Hollopeter, 214 Cal. 427 [6 P.2d 245], it was held that under
the Judicial Council amendment an inferior court judge
could be assigned to a higher court but he must meet the
qualifications of the higher judicial position (admission to
practice for five years
to his election). If that is
necessary it would follow that he must also satisfy the qualifications for the position of judge, that is, holding office by
election or appointment before expiration of his term. And
it has been held that the term "judge" does not apply to
a person whose term of office has expired. (In re Wheelock's
Will, 205 App.Div. 654 [200 N.Y.S. 157] .)
It is unreasonable to believe that the framers of the Judicial
Council provision or the people in adopting it, intended
that the chairman of the council be given such broad authority
by the Constitution that he could select a person for a judicial
assignment, who had never been a judge, or who had been
one, and was defeated for reelection years before or did not
run for reelection. I would hold, therefore, that the Judicia]
Council provision in the Constitution did not confer authority
on the chairman to assign as judges other than those who
were duly elected, qualified and acting and whose term has
not expired.
In the same connection the majority opinion makes the
point that retired judges are judicial officers only when they
are under assignment by the chairman of the Judicial Council;
that at all other times they are lawyers with no official position. Even if that is true, it furnishes no ground for creating
a "temporary" judge who has not been elected as required
by the Constitution, and in any event it is contrary to reason
and logic. In speaking of retired federal judges, the United
States Supreme Court has this to say: ''By retiring pursuant
to the statute a judge does not relinquish his office. The
language is that he may retire from regular active service.
The purpose is, however, that he shall continue, so far as his
age and his health permit, to perform judicial service, and it
is common knowledge that retired judges have, in fact, discharged a large measure of the duties which would be incumbent on them, if still in regular active service. It is scarcely
necessary to say that a ret·ired jttdge's judicial acts would be
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illegal unless he who performed them held the office of judge.
It is a contradiction in terms to assert that one who has
retired in accordance with the statute may continue to function as a federal
and
not hold the office of a judge.
The Act does not and, indeed, could not, endue him with a
new office, different from, but embracing the duties of the
office of judge. He does not surrender his commission, but
continues to act under it.'' (Emphasis added; Booth v.
United States, 291 U.S. :339, :350 [54 S.Ct. 379, 78 L.Ed.

836] .)
The constitutional retirement provision does not authorize
the use of retired judges in a judicial capacity or sanction
legislative authority therefor in the face of the constitutional
provision requiring election and fixing terms of office for
judges. 'l'o hold as does the majority would mean that the
retirement provision repealed by implication the requirement of eleCtion of judges, a drastic conclusion which could
not have been contemplated by the voters in authorizing a
retirement system.
Serious consequences may flow from the holding of the
majority in this case. Similarly the r~egislature could authorize the selection and appointment of a retired but defeated
legislator to fill a vacancy in the Legislature or to serve while
the incumbent legislator ·was incapacitated. The same would
be true of a retired governor. I cannot believe that the constitutional provision for a retirement system was intended
to authorize any sneh a far-reaching and drastic contailment
of the other provisions in the Constitution, indeed in our
whole system of state government. It is no doubt true that
the retirement authorization includes the right to exact further service from the retiree as far as he is concerned, but
when we consider the right of the people as guaranteed by
the Constitution to have their officers, judicial, legislative
and executive, elected by them and serve only for a fixed term,
it is another matter. llequiring that retired judges perform
services after retirement does not carry the right to impose
such judges on the people contrary to the election and term
of office provisions of the Constitution. 'l'he matter may
be simply solved by reqniring the consent of the parties to
the sitting of a retired jmlge as was done by the retirement
act befor(• its amem1ment in 1951. 'l'he pertinent reasoning
in this situation is stated in Pay v. District Court of Appeal,
s~tpra, 200 Cal. 522, 586, where the court l1eld that the amendments to the Constitution providing for pro tempore judges
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to sit on the District Court of Appeal did not mean that the
entire judicial personnel of a District Court of Appeal could
eonsist of pro tempore judges for: "To so interpret these provisions iu said amendments, evidently intended to afford temporary and emergency relief, would be to encourage the
violation of a very vital principle of popular government
which is none other than that of the right of the people of
a commonwealth to have their essential rights, liberties, and
interests in respect to person and property heard and determined by courts of last resort, the constituent membership
of which is composed of public servants of their own selection.
That the people might transfer the direct exercise of this
selection to those whom they may have chosen to administer
the functions of our representative scheme of government is
undoubted, but the text of such transfer, whether embodied
in a constitution or a statute, should be plain and unambiguous.'' The reasoning of the majority opinion is squarely
contrary to the Fay case.
'l'he analogy claimed by the majority between the retirement provision and other provisions in the Constitution which
are expressly made paramount to other constitutional requirements does not exist. The retirement provision not only
does not contain such words of supremacy, but in order to
reach the majority's result we have to read the retirement
provision as if it does have such words, and then take the
further step of implying that authorization for a retirement system includes the right of the Legislature to wipe
ont the constitutional provisions as to election and term of
office of both superior judges and justices of the Supreme
Court and District Courts of Appeal.
In summary, the Constitution :fixes the term of office of
justices of the Supreme Court and District Courts of Appeal
and superior court judges. The Legislature has no power to
extend such terms. Under no reasonable construction can
it be said that such power is granted by the provisions of
section 22a of article IV of the Constitution. In fact, the
antithesis of such construction is indicated. The following
conclusions are inescapable: ( 1) That by accepting retirement the justice or judge has decided to withdraw from thr
position held by him and cease rendering service of a judicial
nature; ( 2) during retirement the justice or judge is restored
to his status as a member of the Bar and entitled to practicP
law which a justice or judge may not do while acting in the
capacity of a judicial officer of the state; (3) tltat his posi-
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tion as a justice or judge will be filled by a successor in a
manner provided for in the Constitution; ( 4) that he is entitled to his retirement salary as a part of the compensation
earned by him for services already rendered and should not
be required to render services in the same capacity after
retirement; (5) that to do so would be discriminatory and
unfair to those who are capable, because tho~e who are incapable of rendering services will receive their retirement
salaries without being required to render services after retirement; (6) that the chairman of the Judicial Council has
no constitutional power or authority to create judicial positions and select justices or judges to fill them or change the
status of a member of the Bar to that of a justice or judge,
and the Legislature cannot constitutionally confer such power
in view of the constitutional provisions hereinabove cited
which expressly provide for the method of selection and term
of office of such justices or judges; (7) that the holding of
the majority in this case strikes a lethal blow against our
republican form of government and is destructive of the
democratic processes set up in our Constitution for the selection of judges; ( 8) and that even if this drastic change in our
form of government were dictated by compellin17 expediency,
I could not accept it, because it is contrary to one of the
basic concepts of popular government declared in the Constitution of California-that the people by popular vote shall
have the right to determine the manner in which their public
officers shall be selected and the term of office of such officials.
I hold, therefore, that the provision in the Judges' Retirement Act, supra, authorizing the assignment of retired judges
to conduct judicial business without the consent of the parties
is unconstitutional.
The Johnsons assert, however, that Moncur was a de facto
judge and hence the judgments are valid. The Pickens reply
that there cannot be a de facto judge unless there is a de jure
court or office of judge; that there was no de jure office or
court here and thus Moncur could not be a de facto judge.
It has been stated, and said to be the majority rule, that
there cannot be a de facto officer where there is no de jure
office or, as to judges, there can be no de facto judge where
there is no de jure court. (People v. Hecht, 105 Cal. 621,
629 [38 P. 941, 45 Am.St.Rep. 96, 27 L.R.A. 203], dictum;
Oakland Pav. Co. v. Donovan, 19 Cal.App. 488, 494 [126 P.
388], dictum; Malaley v. City of Marysville, 37 Cal.App.
638, 640 [174 P. 367], dictum; Kitts v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.
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App. 462, 468 [90 P. 977], dictum; People v. Toal, 85 Cal.
333, 338 [24 P. 603] ; Ex parte Giambonini, 117 Cal. 573
[49 P. 732]; Buck v. City of Eureka, 109 Cal. 504, 512 [30
L.R.A. 409, 42 P. 243] ; see cases from other jurisdictions
collected, 99 A.L.R. 294.) That rule has received sharp criticism mainly for the reason that the public policy underlying
the de facto officer doctrine applies with equal force whether
or not there is a de jure office. (See 2 So.Cal.L.Rev. 236,
243; 9 ibid. 189, 206; 1 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 651; 46 1\'Iich.L.Rev.
439; 13 Minn.L.Rev. 439; 29 ibid. 36; 86 U.Pa.L.Rev. 551.)
The rule has been said to be unsound: "[F]irst, because an
office created or authorized by the legislature should be treated
as de jure until declared otherwise by a competent tribunal,
since a statute must be received and obeyed by the individual
until questioned in, and set aside by, the courts, because every
statute is presumed to be constitutional; second, because the
same reasons behind the rule protecting the acts of a de facto
officer in a de jure office equally apply to acts of a de facto
officer in a de facto ofiice; third, because the attack on the
constitutionality of the ofiice should not be made collaterally
by private parties but should be brought in an action expressly
for the purpose of questioning the validity of acts of an ofiicer
under an unconstitutional statute, for to allow individuals
who deal with public officers to question their authority in
every instance would be productive of uncertainty and of a
disordered society; and fourth, because, historically, the English rule requiring a de jure ofiice, from which the majority
American rule is derived, is not so productive of harsh results, since the acts of English ofiicials are not declared void
because the ofiicer was acting under an unconstitutional
statute." (9 So.Cal.L.Rev. 189, 206.) There are as many
authorities to the contrary. (See cases collected, 9 So.Cal.
L.Rev. 207; 99 A.L.R. 294.) 'rhere are so many so-called
exceptions to the rule or qualifications as to what is a de jure
ofiice that it cannot be said to have invariable application.
Where an ofiice is created by an unconstitutional statute, a
person holding ofiice under the statute before it is declared
unconstitutional may be a de facto ofiicer. (Statement in
State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449 [9 Am.Rep. 409], approved
in People v. Hecht, supra, 105 Cal. 621; Oakland Pav. Co. v.
Donovan, s·upra, 19 Cal.App. 488; Reclamation Dist. No. 70
v. Sherman, 11 Cal.App. 399 [105 P. 277] ; Kitts v. Superior
Court, supra, 5 Cal.App. 462.) If the office has potential
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existence-has not been established but may be-a person
holding it is a de facto officer. (Buck v. City of Enreka,
s~tpra, 109 Cal. 504.)
After a judge's term expires and his
successor is selected, the former may be a de facto judge.
(JYiercecl Bank v. Rosenthal, 99 Cal. 39 [31 P. 849,33 P. 732].)
Even if the de jure office rule is applied, it appears that
within the reason of the qualification heretofore noted, there
is a de jure office-a court, the superior court, and judges of
such court-and it was to act in the capacity of such a judge
that Moncur was assigned. 'l'he method of naming him was
invalid but he was a de facto judge. He had a clear color
of title by reason of the express legislative authority for his
assignment (Judges' Retirement Act, supra) and was regularly assigned by the person authorized to make it.
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-Insofar as
the merits of the controversy are concerned I agree with the
discussion in the majority opinion; as to the power of the
acting judge, I find in our Constitution no authority for, but
much in negation of, the chameleonic status of the retired
judge envisioned in such majority opinion.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of affirmance solely
because by a long line of respectable authority the acts of
acting pro tempore ,Judge Moncur have validity as those of
a de facto officer performing the duties of a de jure court.

